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identity using an online survey via Mechanical Turk. In order to determine how moral 
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internalization and symbolization of moral identity. This suggests that moral foundations can 
contribute to further understanding of empathic traits and moral identity and how they relate 
to moral behavior in reality. We discuss the implications of these results for moral educators 
when starting to teach students about moral issues. 
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How are Moral Foundations Associated with Empathic Traits and Moral Identity? 
We examined the relationship between moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral 
identity using an online survey via Mechanical Turk. In order to determine how moral 
foundations contribute to empathic traits (i.e., empathic concern, perspective taking, personal 
distress, fantasy) and moral identity (i.e., internalization and symbolization), we performed 
classical correlation analysis as well as Bayesian correlation analysis, Bayesian ANCOVA, 
and Bayesian regression analysis. Results showed that individualizing foundations 
(harm/care, fairness/reciprocity) and binding foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, 
purity/sanctity), which are two components of the moral foundations, had various different 
relationships with empathic traits. In addition, the individualizing versus binding foundations 
showed somewhat reverse relationships with internalization and symbolization of moral 
identity. In general, harm/care, the core individualizing foundation, was positively associated 
with all indicators except for personal distress. In the case of the binding foundations, they 
were negatively associated with empathic concern and moral internalization. On the other 
hand, personal distress and moral symbolization showed positive association with the binding 
foundations. This suggests that moral foundations can contribute to further understanding of 
empathic traits and moral identity and how they relate to moral behavior in reality. We 
discuss the implications of these results for moral educators when starting to teach students 
about moral issues. 







The fundamental issue in the field of moral psychology referred to as the “gappiness 
problem” (Darnell et al., 2019) is related to how to bridge the gap between moral judgment 
and moral behavior. According to prior research, moral foundations, empathic traits, and 
moral identity play fundamental roles in moral judgment and how to fill the gap between 
moral judgment and behavior (Hoffman, 2000; Smith et al., 2014). Since all of these factors 
have a unique relationship with moral behavior, and it has been proposed that the solution to 
the gappiness problem likely will not be any one factor alone (Darnell et al., 2019), it would 
be helpful to understand the relationship between factors that have shown some degree of 
promise in filling the gap. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of this issue, we 
first reviewed theoretical frameworks about each of these factors and then moved on to how 
they are associated with each other. Next, we empirically examined the relationship between 
the factors by conducting a Bayesian analysis with cross-sectional data. 
Moral Foundations Theory 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was developed by Haidt and Joseph (2004) in 
order to provide a pluralistic theory of the intuitions and values that people use to make 
decisions about how to behave morally. Haidt and Joseph (2004) surveyed five major 
theoretical pieces examining universal components of morality, cultural variations in 
morality, and evolutionary underpinnings of morality in order to determine what common 
values were found in all of the perspectives. From this, they suggested five foundations that 
people employ to be moral; these are: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. MFT proposes that, to a degree, everybody has a sense 
of morality at birth related to these five intuitions, but these moral values are strongly 
influenced by experience and one’s environment (Graham et al., 2013). Graham et al. (2013) 
state that the morals somebody is born with should be thought of something like a first draft 
that will be rewritten time and time again throughout one’s life.  
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According to this theory, most individuals have intuitions connected to these 
foundations that provoke their reaction when encountering moral issues. Harm/care entails 
having a negative reaction to seeing others being harmed, fairness/reciprocity places value on 
equal relationships which do not involve cheating, ingroup/loyalty prioritizes acting in accord 
with one’s ingroup and feeling negatively towards those who disrupt it somehow, 
authority/respect places value on mutual respect in relationships, and purity/sanctity entails 
having negative feelings towards impure behavior that strays from the norm (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). These foundations are broken down into two 
categories, which are individualizing and binding. Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are 
classified as individualizing foundations because they benefit the individual and focus on 
autonomy whereas ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity are classified as 
binding foundations because they focus more on community and the good of the group.  
When examining how individuals differently use these foundations to assess moral 
issues, political identity is one factor that has provided key insights as to how endorsing 
different foundations influences moral thought. For example, Haidt and Graham (2007) found 
that political identity was the most significant explanatory variable for predicting the moral 
foundations among other categorical variables such as age, education level, gender, etc. It is 
commonly found that liberals rely on only harm/care and fairness/reciprocity while 
conservatives typically employ all five foundations more evenly when considering what is 
moral and how to behave morally (Graham et al., 2009; Silver & Silver, 2017). This 
distinction offers one explanation for why some individuals view certain moral issues as 
more relevant than others and suggests a significant link between moral values and political 
identity (Graham et al., 2009).  
This is important when considering the connection between moral thought and moral 
action, since whether an individual embraces individualizing or binding foundations may 
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significantly influence their moral behavior. For example, as Smith et al. (2014) discuss, 
endorsing the binding foundations has a potential dark side since placing value on acting in 
accord with the in-group may justify immoral behavior towards a member of the out-group. 
This effect was highlighted in a recent study on the COVID-19 pandemic, which found 
that strongly endorsing binding foundations and having faith in President Trump, the current 
president at the time of the study, resulted in defying recommendations such as social 
distancing (Graham et al., 2020). Since individuals that score high on binding foundations 
are more likely to feel the need to be a part of a group and fit in, this may result in putting 
even more trust in authority figures during times of crisis.   
  Another study that explored the effects of binding foundations and the COVID-19 
pandemic found that there was an indirect link between COVID-19 concerns and prejudice 
against migrants, which was mediated by need for cognitive closure (NCC) and respect for 
authority (Bianco et al., 2021). In fact, previous studies have shown a significant positive 
relationship between binding foundations and NCC (Baldner et al., 2018). Individuals 
who have NCC want absolute answers in order to avoid dealing with uncertainty and are 
willing to overlook contradictory information to maintain closure. This suggests that binding 
foundations may be more appealing to some individuals that prefer to rely on group norms 
and authority figures for answers instead of contemplating complex issues such as harm and 
fairness.  
These previous studies demonstrate the real-world implications for how people rely 
on moral foundations to make decisions. It is important to note that previous research has 
shown promise in appealing to whichever moral foundations somebody endorses in order to 
receive support on moral issues. For example, even though environmental issues spark much 
disagreement between conservatives and liberals, one previous study found that when the 
issues were framed in terms of purity, instead of harm as it usually is, differences between the 
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groups were significantly minimized (Feinberg & Willer, 2013). In order to better understand 
how prosocial behavior can result from the endorsement of either binding or individualizing 
foundations, it is important to understand how other moral characteristics influence the 
foundations.  
Empathy and Morality 
In general, empathy refers to how an individual responds to the experiences of others 
(Davis, 1983). Although there has been focus on either affective or cognitive responses over 
the years, it is now generally accepted that multiple aspects of individuals’ reactions to 
others, including emotional (e.g., emotion contagion), motivational (e.g., empathic concern), 
and cognitive aspects (e.g., affective perspective taking) are important for a complete 
understanding of empathy (Decety & Cowell, 2014).  
This multidimensional approach to studying empathy was originally expanded upon 
by Davis (1983) who suggested four components of empathy that are still commonly used: 
empathic concern (EC), perspective taking (PT), personal distress (PD), and fantasy (FS). EC 
involves a concern for others who are experiencing difficulties, PT involves identifying with 
another person’s thoughts and considering their point of view, PD involves being 
overwhelmed by the experiences of others, and FS involves imagining oneself experiencing 
the thoughts and feelings of fictitious characters.  
Although these aspects are all related to empathy, the mechanisms and functions they 
serve can be quite different, which is why it is important to differentiate between them, 
especially when considering issues of morality. In general, among the four subcomponents, 
only EC and PT have been deemed to be conducive to moral and prosocial behavior while 
PD and FS have not. Because EC is about genuine concern for others’ pain and wellbeing and 
PT is required to consider diverse perspectives to make appropriate behavioral decisions, 
these two constructs are inseparable from morality and prosociality (Decety & Cowell, 2014). 
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Findings from previous studies support such a point. EC and PT positively predict complying 
with preventive measures during COVID-19 (Galang et al., 2021) and diverse moral 
functioning indicators, such as developed moral reasoning and prosocial purpose (Han et al., 
2020). On the other hand, the two components are negatively associated with antisocial 
behavior, such as criminal behavior (Martinez et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, PD is reportedly negatively associated with morality in several studies. 
Darnell et al. (2019) suggests that because PD is a self-oriented emotion, it does not produce 
moral behavior but rather other-oriented emotions such as sympathy or EC do. Along with 
this, empathy has been found to prevent moral disengagement whereas PD has been found to 
promote moral disengagement (Paciello et al., 2013). Similarly, additional previous studies 
have also reported negative association between PD and morality and prosociality in diverse 
domains, such as compassion (Thomas, 2013) and volunteering (Carlo et al., 1999). 
Finally, compared with the other empathy subcomponents, FS shows a relatively 
weaker association with moral functioning. For instance, in terms of correlation coefficients, 
FS showed weaker correlation with moral reasoning, moral disengagement, and prosocial 
purpose (Han et al., 2020). Likewise, in other previous studies, FS was not significantly 
associated with moral identity (Black & Reynolds, 2016), moral agency (Black, 2016), moral 
decision-making (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013), or self-reported moral behavior (Strobel et 
al., 2017). Given FS is about how to deal with pains and difficulties experienced by 
imaginary beings, not real people or animals (Davis, 1983), FS would be less important in 
predicting moral functioning compared with other subcomponents, which address more 
realistic issues. 
Although the previous studies have examined the relationship between the 
subcomponents of empathy and moral functioning, none of them have focused on the 
association between moral foundations and different empathic traits. Given that different 
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subcomponents reported association with moral functioning indicators in different directions 
as reported in the studies, they would also be differently associated with different moral 
foundations. Such a point might need to be examined with an empirical investigation. 
Moral Identity 
Moral identity refers to how important being a moral person is to an individual’s 
overall identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). This is considered important for moral behavior 
because it has been suggested that if someone has a strong sense of who they are and their 
moral compass is important to their identity, they will be motivated to act morally in order to 
stay consistent with their identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Damon & Gregory, 
1997).  
The two components of moral identity that Aquino and Reed (2002) have 
conceptualized and most of the work on moral identity has embraced (Jennings et al., 2015) 
are internalization and symbolization. Internalization refers to the private experience of moral 
identity that others do not necessarily see or know about. Symbolization, on the other hand, 
refers to the outward expression of moral identity, such as that reflected in actions or personal 
belongings. Internalization has been shown to have implications for moral behavior, such as 
in Winterich et al.’s study (2012) where donation behavior increased once the charity’s moral 
foundations aligned with the participants’ values, but only for those participants with high 
internalization of moral identity. However, other studies have found symbolization to 
increase charitable giving since it is an outward way to demonstrate a sense of moral identity 
(Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). In addition to self-report survey measures, other methodologies 
have also been used to explore moral identity, such as Colby and Damon’s (1992) study, in 
which they interviewed individuals who were considered moral exemplars and investigated 
how their sense of self and morals intertwined. They found that for these highly moral 
individuals, their sense of self and morality were closely aligned. These findings suggest a 
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significant link between moral identity and moral behavior, however it is still unclear exactly 
how moral identity influences behavior and its relationship to other factors, such as moral 
foundations and empathic traits.  
As mentioned previously, there is concern about a possible dark side of the binding 
foundations. Importantly, Smith et al. (2014) found that moral identity can play a significant 
role in mitigating these potential risks by expanding individuals’ moral circle. This suggests a 
possible avenue for promoting moral behavior regardless of which foundations somebody 
endorses by expanding who is considered when deciding how to act. Still, this study only 
utilized the individualization subcomponent of moral identity, so further work investigating 
the relationship of the foundations with symbolization is necessary.  
Connecting MFT, Empathic Traits, Moral Identity, and the “gappiness” problem 
Due to the previously mentioned “gappiness” problem (Darnell et al., 2019) in the 
field, it would be beneficial to explore how the aforementioned three factors, moral 
foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity, have been considered to influence moral 
judgment and moral behavior. One previous study that addressed the relationship between 
moral foundations and moral judgment reported that individualizing foundations are 
significantly associated with more sophisticated moral reasoning (Baril & Wright, 2012; 
Glover et al., 2014; Han & Dawson, 2021). It is plausible to see such an association, because 
sophisticated moral reasoning, moral reasoning based on the postconventional schema, 
requires a capability to evaluate and deliberate upon existing social norms and conventions in 
a critical manner based on universal moral principles (Choi et al., 2020; Rest et al., 1999). 
Additional study findings support the point by demonstrating that postconventional moral 
reasoning is negatively associated with the endorsement of authority and tradition (Curtis et 
al., 1988; Lan et al., 2008) while positively associated with the endorsement of core moral 
principles, such as harm prevention and caring (Fang et al., 2017; Myyrya et al., 2010). 
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These studies have demonstrated the nature of sophisticated moral judgment in terms 
of its relationship with different moral foundations. This has provided researchers with ideas 
about how different moral foundations differently contribute to the formation of moral 
judgment and its development. However, none of them have paid sufficient attention to 
empathy or moral identity. Because scholars have been concerned about the gap between 
moral judgment and action and many of them have examined empathy and moral identity as 
candidate constructs to fill the gap, examining how empathy and moral identity are associated 
with moral foundations would be informative.  
 Empathy and moral identity are two factors commonly proposed to better understand 
the discrepancy between moral beliefs and moral action (Bergman, 2002; Darnell et al., 2019; 
Hoffman, 2000). This is supported by the current mainstream theoretical framework in the 
field, the four-component model (Han, 2014; Rest et al., 2000), which is also referred to as a 
model that explains the mechanisms of moral behavior to address the gappiness issue 
(Darnell et al., 2019). This theoretical framework suggests four psychological components 
important for moral behavior: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and 
moral character. Moral sensitivity is about decerning whether the current situation is 
potentially morally problematic and may cause any potential harm to others’ welfare 
(Bebeau, 2002); it is required to initiate the further moral psychological processes to generate 
moral behavior (Han, 2017). Moral judgment is related to making a decision to address a 
morally dilemmatic situation based on moral reasoning (Rest et al., 1999). Moral motivation 
is related to whether moral values are prioritized over other self-oriented values, so that one 
can implement the result of moral judgment by behaving morally (Blasi, 2013). Finally, 
moral character, such as courage, is required to initiate and sustain moral behavior even 
under difficulties and threats (Nunner‐Winkler, 2007). According to the Neo-Kohlbergians, 
implementation of moral behavior can be explained by these multiple components, not by 
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one component (Bebeau, 2002). Similar to what has been proposed in recent discussions on 
the gappiness issue, moral judgment does not necessarily result in moral behavior but should 
be supported by other functional components from this perspective. 
Empathy and moral identity, which are two main constructs of interest in the present 
study, have close relationships with the aforementioned functional components filling the gap 
between moral judgment and moral behavior. Empathy is especially important for the moral 
sensitivity component because it involves imagining how others will feel and be affected by 
certain actions (Morton et al., 2006; Sadler, 2004). In addition, moral identity has been 
suggested to be a source of moral motivation because it emphasizes how important one’s 
moral values are to their sense of self in the context of their overall values (Aquino & Reed, 
2002). Furthermore, if moral values are central to who an individual is, motivation to act 
morally will be enhanced (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).  
 Finally, moral foundations can be considered as the factors that constitute the basis of 
moral values, moral beliefs, and how to behave morally. Thus, it would be necessary to 
examine how moral foundations are associated with the aforementioned factors in moral 
functioning, empathic traits and moral identity, to better understand the mechanism of moral 
behavior. In fact, Walker (2002) notes that moral functioning is significantly influenced by 
how important an individual considers their moral values to their identity. Thus, moral 
foundations, which are closely associated with different sets of moral values, perhaps 
contribute to one’s moral identity.  
Given this, we expect that moral foundations might play a fundamental role in 
moderating the functioning of moral identity and empathic traits, which have been suggested 
to modulate moral behavior. Although many previous studies have demonstrated that moral 
foundations significantly influence moral judgment (e.g., Graham et al.,, 2009; Koleva et al., 
2012), which constitutes the basis of moral functioning, as mentioned earlier, only a few have 
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addressed the relationship between moral foundations and the aforementioned two constructs, 
moral identity and empathy. Although a few previous studies have shown various 
relationships between moral foundations and moral identity (e.g., Smith et al., 2014) as well 
as between moral foundations and empathic traits (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 
2011) there has been little work done on the relationship between all three, specifically that 
of how different moral foundations predict moral identity and empathy. Because of this, the 
present study examined how moral foundations contributed to empathic traits and moral 
identity in order to better understand the mechanisms of moral behavior.  
The Present Study 
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, we used data-driven methods such as 
Bayesian statistics and model selection in order to properly investigate the relationships of 
interest. Specifically, we wanted to know how moral foundations uniquely contribute to 
empathic traits and moral identity. To answer the question, we collected data about moral 
foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity from participants and examined the 
relationship between those factors with a data-driven analysis method based on Bayesian 
inference. Because we were mainly interested in the relationship between moral foundations 
and other moral indicators, differences between the moral foundations themselves, such as 
among different political affiliations, were out of the scope of the current study.  
Method 
Participants and procedure 
We recruited 401 participants who completed the questionnaires online via 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk), however after detecting for responses by bots and problematic 
human response sets, the final analysis included 329 participants (171 females; Age M = 
35.47, SD = 9.72; 268 Caucasians, 26 African Americans, 1 American Indian or Alaska 
Native, 10 Asian Americans, 8 Hispanic or Latinx, 15 other ethnicities). For the screening 
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procedures, we employed Dennis et al.’s (2020) bot detection method and Dupuis et al.’s 
(2019) method for detecting the problematic human response sets. The Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index, Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and Moral Identity Scale were presented, 
followed by demographic questions.  
Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study 
at the beginning of the online survey session. Only the participants who agreed to participate 
in the present study after reviewing the consent form were presented with the questionnaires. 
As compensation, participants received $7.25 after completing the study. The study design 
and informed consent form were reviewed by the Institutional Review Board of the 
University of Alabama (IRB protocol number: 17-12-787). 
Measures 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index		
This measure was developed by Davis (1983) in order to provide a measure that takes 
into account the multidimensional nature of empathy. We used each of the four subscales: 
empathic concern (EC) for emotional reactivity, perspective taking (PT) for ability to 
anticipate others’ thoughts, personal distress (PD) for discomfort resulting from emotions of 
others, and fantasy subscale (FS) for level of emotional investment in works of fiction such 
as books and movies. The index consisted of a total of 28 items. Each item was designated to 
measure one of the four subscales. Participants were provided with a list of different thoughts 
and feelings and asked to rate how well the statements describe them using a 5-point Likert 
scale from 0 (doesn’t describe me at all) to 4 (describes me very well). Sample items from 
each subscale include: “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than 
me (EC),” “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision 
(PT),” “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation 
(PD),” “I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me 
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(FS).” The overall reliability of the index, which was estimated in terms of Cronbach’s α was 
good, α = .88. The calculated Cronbach’s α values of all subscales were also good, EC’s α = 
.89, PT’s α = .85, PD’s α = .89, and FS’s α = 84. 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 	
Moral Foundations were measured using this questionnaire developed by Graham et 
al. (2011). The measure begins by asking participants to rate the extent to which certain 
considerations affect how they decide what is right or wrong using a 6-point scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant). Sample items for each foundation 
subscale include: “Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
(harm/care),” “Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
(fairness/reciprocity),” “Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
(ingroup/loyalty),” “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority 
(authority/respect),” and “Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
(purity/sanctity).” There is then a second part of the measure which asks participants to rate 
their level of agreement using a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) with statements similar in nature to the first part. We examine the reliability 
of this questionnaire with Cronbach’s α. The overall α indicated good reliability, α = .89. All 
foundation subscales also showed acceptable to good reliability, harm/care’s α = .76, 
fairness/reciprocity’s α = .76, ingroup/loyalty’s α = .74, authority/respect’s α = .80, and 
purity/sanctity’s α = 86. 
Moral Identity Scale 	
Moral Identity was measured using this scale developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) 
in order to assess how important different moral traits are to somebody’s self-concept. 
Participants were given a list of nine traits (e.g., caring, fair, honest) related to being a moral 
person and asked to imagine somebody with these characteristics and how they would think, 
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feel, and act. They then used a 5-point Likert scale to rate their level of agreement or 
disagreement with 13 statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Of the 13 
statements, five (e.g., “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics”) are assigned to the internalization subscale and six (e.g., “I often buy 
products that communicate the fact that I have these characteristics”) to the symbolization 
subscale. Two statements are not used to measure moral identity. The overall Cronbach α was 
good, α = 81. Cronbach’s α values of both subscales were acceptable to excellent, the 
internalization subscale’s α = .78, and the symbolization subscale’s α = .92. 
Demographics survey		
We surveyed participants’ demographic information and used them as control 
variables in the analyses. The survey questions included questions for participants’ age, 
gender, socioeconomic status (SES), occupation, and political affiliation. The SES was 
measured in terms of participants’ highest earned degree and annual income. The SES was 
quantified in terms of the composite score of the aforementioned two factors. Participants’ 
occupation and political affiliation were measured as categorical variables. The participants 
were asked to select their occupation and political affiliation among presented options (e.g., 
“management, professional, and related,” “service,” “sales and office,” etc. for occupation; 
“republican,” “democratic,” “libertarian,” etc. for political affiliation). 
Analysis 
In order to examine the relationships between the variables of interest, we conducted 
classical correlation analysis along with Bayesian correlation analysis, Bayesian ANCOVA, 
and Bayesian regression analysis. Bayesian methods have been used to examine which 
prediction model best predicted the intended dependent variable with the greatest model 
parsimony in previous studies in moral psychology (e.g., Han, 2021; Han & Dawson, 2021). 
Following the previous studies, in the present study, Bayesian ANCOVA was conducted to 
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examine which independent variables best predicted dependent variables of interest, empathy 
and moral foundation variables. We set five moral foundations as independent variables and 
empathy- and moral identity-related variables as dependent variables. In the ANCOVA 
models, participants’ demographic information (i.e., age, gender, SES, occupation, political 
affiliation) was entered into the models as control variables. Regression analysis was 
performed to examine the direction of association (positive versus negative) between 
independent variables, which were identified in Bayesian ANCOVA, and dependent 
variables, and to estimate regression coefficients.  
We examined whether evidence positively and/or strongly supported our hypotheses 
(e.g., presence of non-zero correlation) with resultant Bayes Factors. Calculated Bayes 
Factors were interpreted based on statistical guidelines that were introduced by Bayesian 
statisticians (Kass & Raftery, 1995) and have been used in previous studies (e.g., Han et al., 
2018). In the present study, we used a logarithm of Bayes Factor (log(BF)). We assumed that 
1 ≤ log(BF) < 3 indicates the presence of evidence positively supporting our hypothesis, 3 ≤ 
log(BF) < 5 indicates the presence of evidence strongly supporting our hypothesis, and 5 ≤ 
log(BF) indicates the presence of evidence very strongly supporting our hypothesis. 
For readers’ information, all data files and JASP scripts are available via the Open 
Science Framework, https://osf.io/kgznt/. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the collected dataset (N = 329 after screening) are presented 
in Table 1. The reported descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation, median, 
skewness, and kurtosis of each subscale in each measure. 
< Table 1 here > 
Correlation analysis 
 19 
< Figure 1 here> 
For empathic traits, Bayesian correlation analysis showed EC positively correlated 
with harm/care, log(BF10) = 65.318, fairness/reciprocity, log(BF10) = 18.542, internalization, 
log(BF10) = 65.047, and symbolization, log(BF10) = 5.588. According to the guidelines for 
interpreting log(BF), all of these results suggest the presence of evidence very strongly 
supporting non-zero correlation between the aforementioned variables. PT positively 
correlated with harm/care, log(BF10) = 35.499, fairness/reciprocity, log(BF10) = 10.258, and 
internalization, log(BF10) = 27.833. PD positively correlated with ingroup/loyalty, log(BF10) 
= 2.903 and negatively correlated with internalization, log(BF10) = 5.395. FS positively 
correlated with harm/care, log(BF10) = 16.687, fairness/reciprocity, log(BF10) = 7.270, 
internalization, log(BF10) = 13.019, and symbolization, log(BF10) = 4.788. 
For moral identity, internalization was positively correlated with harm/care, log(BF10) 
= 29.197 and fairness/reciprocity, log(BF10) = 14.682 but did not have a significant 
correlation with the other foundations. Symbolization, however, had a positive correlation 
with ingroup/loyalty, log(BF10) = 21.605, authority/respect, log(BF10) = 16.213 and 
purity/sanctity, log(BF10) = 14.882 but did not have a significant correlation with the other 
foundations. 
Bayesian model selection and regression analysis 
Model selection using Bayesian ANCOVA and the estimation of selected regression 
coefficients with Bayesian regression showed the best model for EC included harm/care (+, 
positive association) and authority/respect (-, negative association), for PT harm/care (+), for 
PD ingroup/loyalty(+), for FS harm/care(+), ingroup/loyalty(+), and purity/sanctity(-), for 
internalization harm/care(+) and ingroup/loyalty(-), and for symbolization purity/sanctity(+), 
harm/care(+), and ingroup/loyalty(+) (see Figure 2 for the visualization). For further details 
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about the results from Bayesian model selection and regression (e.g., estimated regression 
coefficients), see supplementary tables. 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
Discussion 
The main goal of this study was to explore the associations between moral 
foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity through data-driven examination. The results 
from classical and Bayesian correlation analyses demonstrated that each empathic trait and 
moral identity subscale was differently correlated with the various individualizing and 
binding foundations proposed in MFT. The results of our Bayesian ANCOVA and regression 
analysis showed interesting aspects regarding how moral foundations differently contributed 
to various moral functionalities, empathic traits, and moral identity. Our Bayesian ANCOVA 
results showed that EC, PT, and moral internalization, which have been found to be 
significantly associated with moral decision-making and motivation in general, were well 
explained by harm/care. This is in line with Gray and Schein’s (2012) argument that the 
functioning of the five moral foundations in moral judgment can be explained by the 
harm/care foundation alone. However, PT was the only variable that had a significant 
association with only harm/care. All of the other variables had significant associations with 
other moral foundations as well. 
Interestingly, several binding foundations negatively contributed to the 
aforementioned variables. EC was negatively associated with authority/respect and 
internalization with ingroup/loyalty. In addition, PD was positively associated with 
ingroup/loyalty. These trends are consistent with previous studies that demonstrated the 
complex relationship between loyalty and ethical behavior (e.g., Hildreth et al., 2016). If, as 
the authors suggested, loyalty makes people more likely to act ethically when pressure is low 
but less likely to act ethically when pressure is high, this may result in PD when faced with a 
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moral dilemma or upon feeling conflicted when considering how one’s actions will affect the 
people involved while also considering acting in accord with the ingroup. Additionally, since 
PD was originally thought to hinder the ability to maintain social relationships (Davis, 1983), 
it is possible that once individuals with high PD find an ingroup, they are more motivated to 
be loyal to this group. 
Moral symbolization was positively predicted by both individualizing and binding 
foundations: harm/care, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity. The positive correlation between 
moral symbolization and harm/care is in line with previous research that has shown concern 
for how others will be harmed when deciding the best course of action to take (Cohn et al., 
2019). Conversely, given that moral symbolization is more related to the conduct of moral 
values within social and relational contexts (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Sunil & Verma, 2018), it 
makes sense that moral symbolization would be influenced by binding foundations, which are 
associated with how to maintain community and communal good (Smith et al., 2014). Moral 
symbolization as opposed to moral internalization being positively predicted by binding 
foundations may suggest a possible way to buffer against the potential negative effects of 
endorsing binding foundations. Since individuals who prefer binding foundations are more 
likely to be concerned with their in-group and its values, it may be more effective to approach 
moral issues with them in a manner that emphasizes moral symbolization. One previous 
study suggests that encouraging these individuals to focus on the possibility of losing their 
perception of a moral figure to the public may be effective in promoting moral behavior 
(Szekeres et al., 2019). 
Finally, although the FS subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index is 
controversial due to confusion over how to interpret the subscale and possible similarities 
between empathizing with real people and empathizing with fictional characters (Nomura & 
Akai, 2012), it is worth noting that for the model selection, FS was predicted by three of the 
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five moral foundations; harm/care and ingroup/loyalty were both positively correlated while 
purity/sanctity was negatively correlated. Additionally, FS was positively correlated with 
both internalization and symbolization.  
These findings from our study may provide moral educators with several useful 
insights for moral education. Since empathy and moral identity have been suggested as 
sources of motivation to participate in moral acts by promoting a sense of purpose (Hardy et 
al., 2014; Malin et al., 2015), it may be helpful to understand which moral foundations 
support a strong sense of moral identity. More specifically, our study showed that the 
harm/care foundation is positively associated with both internalization and symbolization. 
This result suggests this is an important place to start when educating children. Thus, moral 
educators may need to consider how to help young children acquire skills to effectively deal 
with potential harm to others and caring for others' welfare.  
In fact, such an aspect of moral functioning has been underscored by Neo-
Kohlbergians; in their theoretical model of moral functioning, the four component model, 
moral sensitivity plays a fundamental role in detecting potential harm to others as well as 
factors that may influence their welfare (Bebeau et al., 1985). Without such moral sensitivity, 
it is difficult to interpret the current situation, perceive potential moral outcomes in terms of 
potential harm and changes in others’ welfare, and behave morally to deal with the situation. 
Moral education focusing on harm and care in early childhood will contribute to the 
development of the aforementioned functionalities including, but not limited to, empathic 
traits, moral sensitivity, and moral identity, as well as future moral development. 
In line with this, Thornberg and Jungert (2013) found that moral sensitivity in 
students was negatively associated with bullying behavior, however, they note that moral 
disengagement and self-efficacy are also crucial factors that mediate this relationship. That is, 
it is important to have moral sensitivity, but if a student does not believe they can do 
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something to stop the bullying, or if they are able to remove themselves from the reality of 
the situation, moral sensitivity may not result in actual behavior (see Bandura, 2002 for 
further details about mechanisms of moral disengagement). This is interesting considering the 
previously discussed idea that empathy is important for moral sensitivity and the finding from 
the current study that authority/respect was negatively associated with EC. One previous 
study used interviews to explore why soccer players committed immoral acts on the field and 
found that many of them placed responsibility for their actions onto referees, whom they 
viewed as an authority figure (Traclet et al., 2011). This suggests that it is important to not 
only teach students the importance of moral values associated with the harm/care foundation 
but also to avoid using mechanisms that promote moral disengagement. This point can be 
related to Neo-Kohlbergian theory that underscores moral education for the development of 
moral judgment to achieve the sophistication of postconventional moral thinking that enables 
students to critically evaluate the moral justifiability of existing authority and convention 
based on moral principles (Rest et al., 1999). 
Given this, methods for moral education that target young children may need to start 
with how to develop their sensitivity to harm and welfare. For instance, Han et al. (2017) 
suggest that using attainable and relevant moral exemplars with strong empathy and moral 
identity may be an effective way to show children examples of people being moral in a way 
that feels realistic for them to emulate. Along with Bandura and McDonald’s (1963) 
suggestion that the presentation of moral exemplars can be an effective measure to promote 
moral development among young children, moral educators may utilize attainable and 
relevant exemplars in the domain of harm and care in moral education for young children. 
Finally, as Malin et al. (2015) suggest, concern for moral issues is necessary for youth to 
possess civic purpose and eventual positive youth development, but it needs to be supported 
by learning about and freely exploring moral values. In fact, Han et al. (2021) showed that 
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the presence of moral identity significantly contributed to the formation and maintenance of 
political purpose during emerging adulthood. Taken together with the present study, this 
would suggest that young children need the opportunity to learn about core values related to 
morality, particularly harm/care that significantly contributes to empathy and moral identity, 
in addition to participating in activities that allow them to understand the values on a deeper 
level. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned points related to moral education and development 
can be applicable to older populations, adults. Although we collected data from college 
students, who are old adolescents or young adults, findings from studies on adulthood moral 
development suggest that moral development can occur beyond adolescence (Colby & 
Damon, 1992). For instance, old adults can identify their prosocial purpose as well as 
empathy even after retiring from their primary career (Bundick et al., 2021). Hence, it would 
be possible to consider developing and implementing programs and activities focusing on the 
core value of harm/care as a way to promote the development of empathic traits and moral 
identity among adults. 
Additionally, due to the negative association between ingroup/loyalty and moral 
internalization, morals based on identifying with a certain group may not lead to a sense of 
empathy and moral identity and ultimately moral behavior. We may discuss the implication 
of this result based on Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development. The result 
from our study is connected with evidence that the ingroup/loyalty foundation is associated 
with the personal interests schema and maintaining norm schema, while the postconventional 
schema that indicates more sophisticated moral judgment is associated with a stronger 
preference for the harm/care foundation (Baril & Wright, 2012). Hence, moral educators may 
need to help students critically reflect upon existing social norms and conventions, which are 
concerned about ingroup membership and loyalty to authority, and take into account 
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fundamental moral principles, which address potential harm to others and their welfare. 
Doing so would be a possible way to promote students’ empathy and moral identity given 
that the harm/care foundation was the fundamental predictor of empathic traits and moral 
identity as demonstrated in our study. 
Limitations 
This study was exploratory in nature, which is a primary limitation. Future research is 
needed in order to replicate the findings as well as investigate the operative power of theories 
of moral identity (Hardy, 2017). It would be interesting to investigate whether the 
relationships examined between moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity would 
affect actual behavior in the real world. Specifically for our measure of moral identity, the 
moral identity scale, it has been found to have strong explanatory power but weak predictive 
power. Due to this, a different measure of moral identity may be necessary when studying 
actual behavior. Moreover, further longitudinal research would be necessary to examine the 
potential causal relationships among moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity 
that could not be examined in the present study that analyzed cross-sectional data.  
Conclusion 
We found that in general, harm/care commonly predicted empathic traits and moral 
internalization, which are closely associated with moral decision-making and motivation at 
the personal level. Interestingly, binding foundations also significantly predicted moral 
symbolization, which deals with moral identity within social and relational contexts. These 
findings may suggest the differentiated associations between moral foundations, empathic 
traits, and moral identity within different domains. 
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Descriptive statistics of Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 
and Moral Identity Scale variables 





Empathic concern (EC) 3.78 .90 3.86 -.61 -.16 
Perspective taking (PT) 3.72 .80 3.71 -.48 .09 
Personal distress (PD) 2.56 .96 2.57 .24 -.56 






Harm/Care 4.62 .86 4.67 -.59 .45 
Fairness/Reciprocity 4.62 .83 4.67 -.52 -.05 
Ingroup/Loyalty 3.31 1.03 3.17 .19 -.30 
Authority/Respect 3.51 1.08 3.50 -.02 -.57 




Internalization 4.28 .76 4.38 -.94 -.12 









Figure 1. Results from both classical and Bayesian correlation analyses. All colored 
circles indicate a significant correlation at p < .05. Circle size and color corresponds to 
correlation coefficients, which are shown in the legend on the right. *: 1 ≤ logBF < 3, **: 3 ≤ 
logBF < 5. ***: 5 ≤ logBF. mfq_hc: harm/care. mfq_fr: fairness/reciprocity. mfq_igl: 
ingroup/loyalty. mfq_ar: authority/respect. mfq_ps: purity/sanctity. iri_ec: empathic concern. 
iri_pd: personal distress. iri_pt: perspective taking. iri_fs: fantasy scale. mis_int: 











Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_hc + mfq_ar 0.250 0.881 22.184 0.000 0.393
mfq_hc 0.125 0.119 0.947 -1.308 0.382
Null model (incl. SEX.f, calc_ses, RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2,





OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4,
political_5)
0.250 6.638e -24 1.991e -23 -53.242 0.080
Null model (incl. SEX.f, calc_ses, RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2,





OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4,
political_5)
0.250 6.638e -24 1.991e -23 -53.242 0.080
mfq_ar 0.125 2.605e -24 1.824e -23 -53.485 0.084
Note.  All models include SEX.f, calc_ses, RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10,
OCCUPATION.f_2, OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7,
OCCUPATION.f_8, OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 26.497 0.282 1.000 1.000 0.000 25.942 27.051
mfq_hc 0.638 0.054 0.375 1.000 53.008 0.532 0.744
mfq_ar -0.094 0.042 0.375 0.881 2.512 -0.177 -0.011
SEX.f 0.377 0.568 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.739 1.494
calc_ses -0.320 0.183 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.679 0.040
RACE.f_6 -0.373 1.775 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.864 3.119
RACE.f_2 -0.178 1.036 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.216 1.860
RACE.f_8 1.010 1.307 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.561 3.581
RACE.f_4 -1.945 1.601 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.095 1.205
RACE.f_3 2.959 4.954 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.788 12.705
OCCUPATION.f_10 0.792 1.089 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.351 2.935
OCCUPATION.f_2 -0.401 0.916 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.202 1.401
OCCUPATION.f_3 -0.817 0.809 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.409 0.775
OCCUPATION.f_11 0.401 0.891 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.352 2.154
OCCUPATION.f_6 -0.270 1.495 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.212 2.672
OCCUPATION.f_5 -2.359 1.515 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.338 0.621
OCCUPATION.f_7 -0.189 2.501 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.109 4.730
OCCUPATION.f_7 -0.189 2.501 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.109 4.730
OCCUPATION.f_8 -0.401 1.585 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.520 2.717
OCCUPATION.f_9 4.153 2.860 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.473 9.779
OCCUPATION.f_4 4.704 4.918 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.971 14.379
political_2 -0.693 0.717 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.104 0.719
political_6 -0.578 0.914 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.376 1.219
political_4 -0.484 1.554 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.541 2.572
political_5 2.577 2.590 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.518 7.672
IRI PT
Model Comparison
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_hc 0.500 1.000 1.406e +12 0.000 0.242






OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4,
political_5)
0.500 7.114e -13 7.114e -13 -27.972 0.054
Note.  All models include RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10, OCCUPATION.f_2,
OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7, OCCUPATION.f_8,
OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 26.009 0.278 1.000 1.000 0.000 25.463 26.555
mfq_hc 0.418 0.052 0.500 1.000 27.972 0.316 0.519
RACE.f_6 -0.758 1.708 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.119 2.603
RACE.f_2 0.904 0.989 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.042 2.849
RACE.f_8 5.526e -4 1.251 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.460 2.461
RACE.f_4 -2.376 1.528 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.383 0.630
RACE.f_3 3.618 4.742 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.711 12.947
OCCUPATION.f_10 0.892 1.033 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.140 2.923
OCCUPATION.f_2 0.248 0.842 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.408 1.904
OCCUPATION.f_3 0.823 0.767 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.687 2.332
OCCUPATION.f_11 -0.663 0.845 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.325 0.999
OCCUPATION.f_6 -0.929 1.411 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.706 1.847
OCCUPATION.f_5 -0.089 1.433 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.907 2.729
OCCUPATION.f_7 0.377 2.402 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.349 5.102
OCCUPATION.f_8 0.351 1.523 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.646 3.348
OCCUPATION.f_9 2.087 2.748 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.318 7.492
OCCUPATION.f_4 2.987 4.712 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.282 12.256
OCCUPATION.f_4 2.987 4.712 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.282 12.256
political_2 -0.704 0.687 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.056 0.647
political_6 -0.154 0.878 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.881 1.573
political_4 0.604 1.491 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.329 3.536
political_5 0.539 2.483 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.346 5.425
IRI PD
Model Comparison
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_igl 0.500 0.975 38.245 0.000 0.077




OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6,
political_4, political_5)
0.500 0.025 0.026 -3.644 0.043
Note.  All models include RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10, OCCUPATION.f_2,
OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7, OCCUPATION.f_8,
OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 17.942 0.369 1.000 1.000 0.000 17.215 18.669
mfq_igl 0.160 0.055 0.500 0.975 3.644 0.053 0.268
RACE.f_6 -0.380 2.154 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.616 3.857
RACE.f_2 0.710 1.247 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.743 3.163
RACE.f_8 2.275 1.587 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.846 5.397
RACE.f_4 1.613 1.931 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.186 5.411
RACE.f_3 -1.164 6.005 1.000 1.000 0.000 -12.977 10.649
OCCUPATION.f_10 1.057 1.301 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.503 3.617
OCCUPATION.f_2 -0.814 1.064 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.907 1.279
OCCUPATION.f_3 -1.187 0.970 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.095 0.722
OCCUPATION.f_11 -0.381 1.062 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.471 1.708
OCCUPATION.f_6 -0.481 1.794 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.011 3.048
OCCUPATION.f_5 -1.442 1.822 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.027 2.143
OCCUPATION.f_7 -1.300 3.036 1.000 1.000 0.000 -7.273 4.673
OCCUPATION.f_8 -0.054 1.904 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.800 3.693
OCCUPATION.f_9 2.558 3.469 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.266 9.383
OCCUPATION.f_4 -6.997 5.945 1.000 1.000 0.000 -18.693 4.698
political_2 0.116 0.867 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.589 1.821
political_6 1.237 1.109 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.943 3.418
political_4 1.668 1.884 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.039 5.375
political_5 0.127 3.134 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.039 6.292
IRI FS
Model Comparison
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_hc + mfq_igl + mfq_ps 0.250 0.876 21.109 0.000 0.224
mfq_hc + mfq_ps 0.083 0.079 0.940 -1.310 0.210
mfq_hc 0.083 0.032 0.369 -2.197 0.199
mfq_hc + mfq_igl 0.083 0.013 0.148 -3.090 0.200
mfq_igl + mfq_ps 0.083 3.779e -8 4.157e -7 -15.860 0.117





political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5)
0.250 7.075e -9 2.122e -8 -18.634 0.086
mfq_ps 0.083 2.261e -9 2.487e -8 -18.676 0.091
mfq_igl 0.083 2.111e -9 2.322e -8 -18.745 0.090
Note.  All models include RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10, OCCUPATION.f_2,
OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7, OCCUPATION.f_8,
OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 24.122 0.313 1.000 1.000 0.000 23.506 24.737
mfq_hc 0.347 0.058 0.500 1.000 16.827 0.232 0.461
mfq_igl 0.137 0.065 0.500 0.889 2.079 0.009 0.266
mfq_ps -0.133 0.047 0.500 0.954 3.038 -0.226 -0.040
RACE.f_6 -1.685 1.903 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.428 2.058
RACE.f_2 0.948 1.105 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.225 3.121
RACE.f_8 0.163 1.400 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.590 2.916
RACE.f_4 -1.090 1.710 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.454 2.274
RACE.f_3 -6.368 5.342 1.000 1.000 0.000 -16.878 4.142
OCCUPATION.f_10 0.910 1.152 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.356 3.176
OCCUPATION.f_2 0.225 0.941 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.626 2.076
OCCUPATION.f_3 -1.542 0.856 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.227 0.143
OCCUPATION.f_11 -2.387 0.941 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.238 -0.536
OCCUPATION.f_6 -1.859 1.589 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.986 1.268
OCCUPATION.f_5 1.471 1.611 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.697 4.640
OCCUPATION.f_7 -1.738 2.680 1.000 1.000 0.000 -7.010 3.535
OCCUPATION.f_8 -1.630 1.699 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.971 1.712
OCCUPATION.f_9 3.275 3.061 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.748 9.297
OCCUPATION.f_4 -9.944 5.252 1.000 1.000 0.000 -20.275 0.388
political_2 1.014 0.765 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.491 2.519
political_6 0.019 0.978 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.904 1.942
political_4 -2.196 1.664 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.469 1.076
political_5 2.398 2.767 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.045 7.842
political_5 2.398 2.767 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.045 7.842
MIS INT
Model Comparison
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_hc + mfq_igl 0.333 1.000 41152.555 0.000 0.276
mfq_hc 0.167 4.860e  -5 2.430e  -4 -9.239 0.219
mfq_igl 0.167 3.316e -14 1.658e -13 -30.344 0.081






OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4,
political_5)
0.333 2.836e -15 5.672e -15 -33.496 0.052
Note.  All models include RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10, OCCUPATION.f_2,
OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7, OCCUPATION.f_8,
OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 21.369 0.184 1.000 1.000 0.000 21.007 21.731
mfq_hc 0.295 0.035 0.500 1.000 30.955 0.227 0.364
mfq_igl -0.134 0.029 0.500 1.000 9.932 -0.191 -0.077
RACE.f_6 -1.275 1.138 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.515 0.964
RACE.f_2 -0.216 0.659 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.513 1.080
RACE.f_8 -0.615 0.838 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.263 1.033
RACE.f_4 0.237 1.019 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.767 2.242
RACE.f_3 2.885 3.176 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.363 9.132
OCCUPATION.f_10 1.335 0.689 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.020 2.690
OCCUPATION.f_2 0.923 0.562 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.183 2.029
OCCUPATION.f_3 -0.066 0.512 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.073 0.941
OCCUPATION.f_11 0.016 0.563 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.092 1.124
OCCUPATION.f_6 0.613 0.948 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.251 2.477
OCCUPATION.f_5 -1.093 0.964 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.988 0.803
OCCUPATION.f_7 -0.191 1.602 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.343 2.962
OCCUPATION.f_8 -0.392 1.016 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.391 1.608
OCCUPATION.f_9 0.050 1.831 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.552 3.653
OCCUPATION.f_4 1.774 3.141 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.406 7.954
political_2 0.053 0.458 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.848 0.954
political_6 -0.665 0.585 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.816 0.485
political_4 0.622 0.994 1.000 1.000 0.000 -1.334 2.578
political_5 1.165 1.655 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.092 4.421
MIS SYM
Model Comparison
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M
Log(BF
10 ) R²
mfq_hc + mfq_igl + mfq_ps 0.250 0.766 9.823 0.000 0.193
mfq_hc + mfq_igl 0.083 0.108 1.336 -0.857 0.182
mfq_igl + mfq_ps 0.083 0.083 0.992 -1.127 0.181
mfq_igl 0.083 0.039 0.442 -1.889 0.170
mfq_hc + mfq_ps 0.083 0.004 0.042 -4.212 0.161
mfq_ps 0.083 5.069e -4 0.006 -6.222 0.142
mfq_hc 0.083 2.154e -8 2.369e -7 -16.288 0.071





political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5)
0.250 3.736e -9 1.121e -8 -19.139 0.044
Note.  All models include RACE.f_6, RACE.f_2, RACE.f_8, RACE.f_4, RACE.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_10, OCCUPATION.f_2,
OCCUPATION.f_3, OCCUPATION.f_11, OCCUPATION.f_6, OCCUPATION.f_5, OCCUPATION.f_7, OCCUPATION.f_8,
OCCUPATION.f_9, OCCUPATION.f_4, political_2, political_6, political_4, political_5.
Posterior Summary
Posterior Summaries of Coefficients
95% Credible Interval
Coefficient Mean SD P(incl) P(incl|data) Log(BF inclusion ) Lower Upper
Intercept 16.576 0.332 1.000 1.000 0.000 15.923 17.229
mfq_hc 0.122 0.061 0.500 0.878 1.975 0.001 0.242
mfq_igl 0.218 0.069 0.500 0.996 5.447 0.083 0.353
mfq_ps 0.092 0.050 0.500 0.853 1.759 -0.006 0.189
RACE.f_6 0.552 2.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.384 4.487
RACE.f_2 1.728 1.161 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.557 4.012
RACE.f_8 1.991 1.471 1.000 1.000 0.000 -0.904 4.885
RACE.f_4 -0.882 1.798 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.419 2.655
RACE.f_3 2.180 5.617 1.000 1.000 0.000 -8.870 13.229
OCCUPATION.f_10 -0.261 1.211 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.643 2.122
OCCUPATION.f_2 -0.882 0.989 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.828 1.064
OCCUPATION.f_3 -0.688 0.900 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.459 1.083
OCCUPATION.f_11 -1.650 0.989 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.596 0.295
OCCUPATION.f_6 -0.889 1.671 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.176 2.398
OCCUPATION.f_5 -1.162 1.693 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.493 2.169
OCCUPATION.f_7 -0.212 2.818 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.755 5.331
OCCUPATION.f_8 -1.339 1.786 1.000 1.000 0.000 -4.852 2.175
OCCUPATION.f_9 -0.050 3.218 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.381 6.282
OCCUPATION.f_4 3.570 5.521 1.000 1.000 0.000 -7.293 14.432
political_2 -0.933 0.804 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.515 0.649
political_6 -0.889 1.028 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.911 1.133
political_6 -0.889 1.028 1.000 1.000 0.000 -2.911 1.133
political_4 0.371 1.749 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.070 3.811
political_5 -1.134 2.909 1.000 1.000 0.000 -6.857 4.589
